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Abstract
This paper synthesizes available information on five Category A pathogens (Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Francisella
tularensis, Variola major and Lassa) to develop quantitative guidelines for how environmental pathogen concentrations may
be related to human health risk in an indoor environment. An integrated model of environmental transport and human
health exposure to biological pathogens is constructed which 1) includes the effects of environmental attenuation, 2)
considers fomite contact exposure as well as inhalational exposure, and 3) includes an uncertainty analysis to identify key
input uncertainties, which may inform future research directions. The findings provide a framework for developing the
many different environmental standards that are needed for making risk-informed response decisions, such as when
prophylactic antibiotics should be distributed, and whether or not a contaminated area should be cleaned up. The approach
is based on the assumption of uniform mixing in environmental compartments and is thus applicable to areas sufficiently
removed in time and space from the initial release that mixing has produced relatively uniform concentrations. Results
indicate that when pathogens are released into the air, risk from inhalation is the main component of the overall risk, while
risk from ingestion (dermal contact for B. anthracis) is the main component of the overall risk when pathogens are present
on surfaces. Concentrations sampled from untracked floor, walls and the filter of heating ventilation and air conditioning
(HVAC) system are proposed as indicators of previous exposure risk, while samples taken from touched surfaces are
proposed as indicators of future risk if the building is reoccupied. A Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis is conducted and
input-output correlations used to identify important parameter uncertainties. An approach is proposed for integrating these
quantitative assessments of parameter uncertainty with broader, qualitative considerations to identify future research
priorities.
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Introduction
Biological weapons, also known as ‘‘the poor man’s atom bomb’’,
have been included in terrorists’ arsenal because of their capability
of producing mass causalities combined with natural access to the
pathogens, manageable technical challenges and relatively low costs
to launch an attack [1,2,3]. Prior to the 2001 anthrax letter attacks,
identified bioterrorism attacks included the release of Salmonella
typhimurium to eleven restaurant salad bars in the city of Portland in
1984 to influence an election, which caused the infection of 750
people, and the release of B. anthracis spores in Tokyo by the
religious group Aum Shinrikyo between 1990 and 1995, which
failed to infect any people [4,5]. The 2001 anthrax letter attacks
infected 22 people (11 inhalational cases and 11 cutaneous cases
[6]), caused the deaths of 5 people, and cost hundreds of millions of
dollars in clean up costs [7]. The attacks revealed that the U.S.
lacked the guidelines for a quick response to such attacks, as well as
decontamination standards for bioterrorism agents [8].
As a result, research has been undertaken to better understand
the risks resulting from a bioterrorist attack. Sextro et al. modeled
the spread of B. anthracis spores in a hypothetical office suite,
estimated occupants’ exposure, and found that activity-related
resuspension was an important source of human exposure [9]. This
modeldidnotconsider environmental decayofthepathogen.While
B. anthracis is a persistent pathogen whose environmental decay rate
can be treatedas zero for a short time simulation [10], Sextro et al.’s
model would need to be modified to include environmental
attenuation in order to be used to estimate the fate and transport
of non-persistent biological agents. Price et al. [11] created a
framework to link the degree of contamination in a building to the
risk to the occupants, which could also be used to establish a
decontamination standard if an acceptable risk level is provided. In
addition, Price et al. linked the number of negative samples to the
level of statistical confidence in the determination that the building
had been effectively decontaminated [11]. However, this study did
not provide a mechanistic model to describe the long term fate and
transport and overall mass balance of the released pathogens,
instead using a proportionality relationship to link the short term
surface concentration of deposited pathogens to the short term
concentration of aerosolized ones. Hong et al. [12] modeled the
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office, and used concentrations found in different environmental
media (i.e., surface, wall, ventilation filter, etc.) to infer future or past
aerosol exposure. At the same time, they applied probability
sampling theory in determining the minimum sampling area
corresponding to certain levels of confidence in meeting allowable
residual risk targets. The variability during sampling recovery and
the potential for clumping of B. anthracis were taken into account.
Besides not including pathogen decay, the above-mentioned studies
quantify only inhalational risk, and omit threats from ingestion and
dermal contact.
While models for B. anthracis have focused on a single pathway,
inhalation exposure, mathematical models have been developed for
influenza that take multiple disease transmission routes, such as
inhalation and ingestion, into account [13,14,15]. Nicas and Gang
introduced a Markov chain model to quantify multiple-pathway
exposuretoinfluenzafor a health-careworkerwhohad close contact
with a patient [16]. Three exposure routes were concerned, hand-
mucous membranes, inhalation, and direct projection of pathogen-
containing droplets ontomucous membranes.Ina subsequentstudy,
Nicasetal. applied theirmodelto quantifythe relative importanceof
different influenza virus exposure pathways, and pointed out that
model uncertainties had significant impacts on the conclusion as to
which pathway is dominant [17]. Atkinson and Wein constructed a
four-person household transmission model to quantify the dominant
transmission route for pandemic influenza [14,15]. Both of the
studies performed analysis on the recognized major transmission
pathways: droplet, airborne, and contacts [18,19]. However, the
above-mentioned studies adopted fixed parameter values in the
computations instead of distributions across possible values, which
does not account for variability and uncertainty. There is evidence
that including uncertainty and variability is important [20,21].
Smieszek compared predictions from a mechanistic exposure model
and empirical data from a contact diary study to analyze the impacts
of different contact intensities and durations. Results showed that
treating all the contacts equally overestimated the expected number
ofinfectedindividuals[20].AstudybyJulianetal.usedMonteCarlo
simulation to analyze variability and uncertainty in the risk due to
nondietary ingestion of rotavirus, relying on a micro-level activity
time series [21], which may inspire future high-resolution microbial
risk assessment [22].
These multiple pathway models have been applied to common
transmissible pathogens but have not addressed Category A
agents. They have generally sought to identify which pathways are
of concern, rather than informing the development of quantitative
standards for response actions. To address the need for such
quantitative standards this paper synthesizes available information
on five Category A pathogens to develop a framework for relating
environmental pathogen concentrations to human health risk. The
five pathogens considered are: B. anthracis, Y. Pestis, F. tularensis,
Variola major, and Lassa. Properties of each of these pathogens are
described below.
B.anthracisisa Gram-positive,facultativelyanaerobic, rod-shaped
bacterium of the genus Bacillus. It is the causative agent of anthrax,
an acute disease in humans and animals, which is highly lethal in
some forms. B. anthracis is one of only a few bacteria that can form
long-lived spores. Y. pestis, the causative agent of plague, is a Gram-
negative facultative anaerobic bipolar-staining bacillus bacterium
belonging to the family Enterobacteriaceae. Plague may be manifested
in one of three forms: bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic plague
[23]. Francisella tularensis is a pathogenic species of Gram-negative
bacteria that causes the zoonotic disease tularemia. F. tularensis is
reported to be one of most infectious organisms known. It is an
intracellular pathogen, replicating mainly in macrophages, and has
also been reported in amoebae [24]. Variola major is the causative
agent of smallpox. There has been no effective treatment developed
for this disease, which has an average 30% mortality rate. Lassa
virus, the causative agent of one type of hemorrhagic fever, infects
more than 200,000 people per year causing more than 3,000 deaths
with a mortality rate of about 15% among the hospitalized cases
[25]. The selected Category A pathogens represent a range of
environmental persistencies from a pathogen with a very low decay
rate(B.anthracis), toseveral with highdecayrates(Y.Pestis,F. tularensis,
and Lassa), as well as one with a moderate decay rate (Variola major).
The objective of this study is to expand the framework that
Hong et al. [12] developed for linking environmental concentra-
tions of B. anthracis with human health risk by 1) including the
effects of environmental attenuation, 2) considering a variety of
different pathogens instead of a single one (B. anthracis), 3) taking
account of contact exposure (ingestion or dermal risk) as well as
inhalational exposure, and 4) conducting an uncertainty analysis
and identifying key input uncertainties. Both detailed and reduced
form solutions to the equations linking risk to environmental
concentrations are developed, which could benefit in making risk-
informed response decisions, such as determining when prophy-
lactic antibiotics should be distributed, and whether or not a
contaminated area should be cleaned up. Monte Carlo methods
are used to assess uncertainty in the results and identify important
uncertainties in input parameters so that future research may be
directed towards reducing them.
Methods
2.1 Fate and transport model
In this study, an occupant is modeled as continuously present in
a one-room office with a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
(HVAC) system (Figure 1). This person has the chance of inhaling
aerosolized pathogens and ingesting pathogens deposited on the
touched surfaces through the surface-hand-mouth transmission
route. For B. anthracis, the ingestion risk is replaced by cutaneous
risk since this was a more important exposure route than ingestion
in the 2001 anthrax letter attacks [6]. The room is modeled as a set
of completely mixed compartments. This assumption fails to
capture localized areas of high risks, such as a high concentrated
puff of pathogens right after the initial release. Thus, the approach
developed here is more appropriate for situations somewhat
removed in time and space from the initial release, where mixing
has occurred and concentrations are relatively uniform.
The governing equation for the fate and transport of released
pathogens is presented in Equation 1:
dM(t)
  !
dt
~K
!
M(t)
  !
ð1Þ
and its initial conditions (M(0)
    !
) is defined as:
M(0)
    !
~M0
 !
The general solution to Equation 1 is expressed as:
M(t)
  !
~L
!
exp({N
!
t)(L
!{1
M(0)
    !
) ð2Þ
where N
!
and L
!
contain the eigenvalues and eigenvectors after
eigendecompositingthetransfermatrix K
!
based onEquation3 [26]:
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For the fate and transport model used in this paper, M(t)
  !
is a
vector representing the numbers of pathogens in each of 10
modeled states with subscripts: 1) air (indoor air, Mair), 2) ts
(horizontal touchable surfaces from which spores may be
transferred to human hands, Mts), 3) tf (tracked floor from which
spores may be re-suspended by walking or other activities, Mtf), 4)
utf (untracked floor from which there is no re-suspension, Mutf), 5)
w (walls, Mw), 6) f (HVAC filter, Mf), 7) n (the nasal passages, Mn),
8) h (hands of an occupant of the office, Mh), 9) ec (all areas
external to the room, Mec), and 10) d (decayed pathogens,Md).
Thus Equation 1 can be detailed written as:
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.
Mtf
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.
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where
A~{½(1{ef)p{1 
Q
V
z(ltszltfzlutfzlwz
Inhen
V
zcair) ð5Þ
The solution to this set of ordinary differential equations gives
the concentration of pathogens in the 10 different compartments
as a function of time. Because the system is linear, masses in
different compartments will be proportional to the release
quantity. Thus, solving the system gives the constant of
proportionality so that measured surface concentrations can be
related to release quantity and risk to occupants. In Equation 4,
the deposition from the air compartment to compartment i is
modeled as a first-order process with rate constants of li (with i
values as described above). A second source of removal is by the
HVAC system. The total air flow rate through the HVAC system
is denoted by Q (units of m
3/s), p (dimensionless) is the fraction of
total air flow that is recirculated into the building by the HVAC
system, ef (dimensionless) is the efficiency of the filter at removing
particles, and V is the volume of the room (m
3). Removal to the
occupants’ nasal passages is also modeled with Inh (m
3/s),
denoting the breathing flow rate, and en (dimensionless), the
efficiency of the nasal passages at removing particles. Removal by
losing viability in each compartment is modeled as a first order
rate with separate decay rates, ci. However, due to limited data,
only two types of decay values are available (Table 1), 1) the air
decay rate (cair), which is used for the air and external
compartments, and 2) the fomite decay rate (cfomite), which is
Table 1. Category A Pathogen’s Environmental Persistency.
Pathogen
Averaged
decay rate in the
air (cair)( h r
21)
Range of decay
rate in the air
(cair)( h r
21)
a Condition Source
Averaged decay
rate on fomite
(cfomite)( h r
21)
Range of decay
rate on the fomite
(cfomite)( h r
21)
a Condition Source
B. anthracis 8.16610
25 (1.11610
25,
1.97610
24)
NA [43,44] 3.36610
25 (1.92610
25, 4.64610
25) NA [43,45,46,47]
Y. pestis 2.75 (2.10, 3.49) T=26uC,
rH=20–87%
[48] 4.55610
21 (0.04, 1.24) T=11–22uC, rH=30–55%
metal, steel, glass, paper,
and Polyethylene
[49,50]
F. tularensis 3.27 (0.55, 9.20) T=20–40uC,
rH=85%
[51,52,53] 2.39610
21 (0.01, 0.46) T=25–37uC, rH=10–
100% on metal
[50]
Variola major 4.55610
22 (1.00610
22,
1.30610
21)
T=10–34uC,
rH=20–80%
[54,55] 6.89610
23 (5.45610
23, 9.95610
23) T=25–37uC, rH=3–96%
on glass
[56]
Lassa 2.6 (0.78, 4.14) T=24–28uC,
rH=30–80%
[57] 7.67610
21b (0.68, 0.92) T=20uC, rH=NA on
aluminum
[58]
aUniform distribution is assumed between the maximum and minimum values.
bDue to the lack of information on Lassa, the average of the decay rates of Bunyaviridae hantavirus, Sicilian virus Sabin, and Crimean-Congp on fomites are used for
Lassa.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.t001
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tracked floor due to occupants walking and other activities is also
modeled as a first order process with rate constant m (units of s
21).
The interactions between human and fomites are represented by
hand-surface (rhs) and surface- hand (rsh) contact rates, as well as
mass transfer fractions between hand to surface (fhs), surface to
hand (fsh), and hand to mouth (fhm).
The deposition rates can be expressed in terms of parameters
representing the indoor air flow conditions [27,28,29]:
ltf(utf)~
Atf(utf)
V
|
v
1{e
{ pv
2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ddif ke
p ð6Þ
lw~
Aw
V
|
2
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ddifke
p
ð7Þ
v~
gddia
2(rp{rair)
18mair
ð8Þ
where Atf(utf) is the surface area of the tracked or untracked floor,
Aw is the surface area of the walls, Ddif is the particle’s diffusivity,
ke is turbulence intensity, v is particle settling velocity, which is
given in Equation 8 as a function of the gravitational constant (g),
the particle’s diameter (ddia), the viscosity of air (mair), the density of
the particle (rp), and the density of air (rair).
2.2 Release scenarios
Two pathogen release scenarios are considered. In the first
scenario, pathogens are released to the air compartment. The
occupant directly inhales aerosolized pathogens and ingests the
deposited ones via surface-hand-mouth contacts. Environmental
concentrations measured at the end of the exposure period are used
to characterizetheriskfromthe past aerosolrelease,and as suchitis
termedtheretrospective scenario.Inthesecond scenario,pathogens
are initially present on the touched surfaces, where they may be
ingested by surface-hand-mouth contacts. In addition, human-
caused resuspension introduces the pathogens into the air where
they can be inhaled by the occupant. Environmental concentrations
at the beginning of the exposure period are used to predict the
future risk and as such the scenario is termed the prospective
scenario. This scenario addresses the residual risk present after
aerosolized particles have had the opportunity to deposit onto
surfaces, a key issue in establishing a decontamination standard.
The exposure dose (ddose) is composed of two sources: inhalation
and ingestion. Based on Equation 9, the inhalation dose is
obtained by integrating the inhalation rate (Inh) and the
pathogen’s air concentration (Cair) over the total exposure
duration (the exposure begins at t1 and ends at t2, while the agent
is introduced at t=0), and the ingestion dose equals the integral of
the hand-mouth contact rate (rhm), mass transfer fraction from
hand to month during each contact (fhm), the involved area of a
human hand (Ah), and the pathogen’s concentration on the hand
(Ch) over the same exposure period:
ddose~Inh
ðt2
t1
Cair(t)dtzAhrhmfhm
ðt2
t1
Ch(t)dt ð9Þ
For dermal contact, ingestion dose is replaced by the total amount
of pathogen transferred to the hand from touched surfaces:
ddose~Inh
ðt2
t1
Cair(t)dtzrshfsh
ðt2
t1
Cts(t)dt ð10Þ
This equation is applied for B. anthracis instead of Equation 9,
where Cts is pathogen’s concentration on the touched surface.
However, separate dose-response coefficients are used for the
different exposure pathways for anthrax. The dermal dose-
response parameter is tuned so as to produce equal numbers of
dermal and inhalation cases for the aerosol release scenario, as was
observed in the 2001 attacks.
2.3 Dose-response functions
The exponential (Equation 11) and beta-Poisson (Equation 12)
dose-response models, which have been widely used in microbial
risk assessment [30], are used in this study:
P(ddose)~1{e{Rddose ð11Þ
P(ddose)~1{ 1z
ddose
N50
| 2
1
a{1
      {a
ð12Þ
In Equations 11 and 12, P(ddose) is the probability of positive
response (infection, illness, or death) for a population average dose,
which allows for Poisson variability in individual exposure [31]. R
is the parameter of the exponential dose-response model, N50, and
a are the parameters of the beta-Poisson model. When the risk is
relatively small, a first-order Taylor series expansion can be used
to approximate Equations 11 and 12 as [12]:
P(ddose)&Rddose ð11aÞ
P(ddose)&
a
b
ddose~
a
N50
(2
1
a{1)ddose ð12aÞ
This transformation can simplify the low dose risk estimation,
which is where this approach is intended for use (i.e., for areas
removed from the initial release where concentrations will be
relatively uniform over spatial scales of interest. When the exposure
dose is high, the full model (Equations 11 and 12) should be used.
2.4 Linking pathogen concentrations to risk
2.4.1 Retrospective scenario. Given that it is rarely possible
to have real-time pathogen air concentrations during a biological
attack, the objective in the retrospective scenario is to use surface
samples to infer what exposure and risk resulted from the release.
Thus, the following discussion develops relationships between
pathogen concentrations on surfaces and average dose.
After an aerosol release, the amount of pathogens in the air
(Mair), on the touched surfaces (Mts), and on occupants’ hands (Mh)
can be acquired by solving Equation 13, which is obtained by
separating out the compartments which exchange microbes from
Equation 4, with the resuspension process omitted because of its
minimal impact over the short time period required for the aerosol
release to disperse (hours) [12]:
Mair
.
Mts
.
Mh
.
0
B B B @
1
C C C A
~
{A 00
lts {(ctszrshfsh) rhsfhs
0 rshfsh {(chzrhsfhs)
0
B @
1
C A
Mair
Mts
Mh
0
B @
1
C Að13Þ
whose initial conditions are:
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Based on the general solution listed in Equation 2, the solutions
to Equation 13 are:
Mair~Mair0e-At ð14Þ
Mts~
BMair0
V
W
eAt {
((C{F)Wz2BeE)sinh( H
2 t){HWcosh( H
2 t)
He
CzF
2 t
()
ð15Þ
Mh~
BEMair0
2HV
HzY
e
(CzFzH
2 )t
{
H{Y
e
(CzF{H
2 )t
{2He{At
()
ð16Þ
where sinh and cosh are hyperbolic trigonometric functions. The
coefficient A is defined by Equation 5 above while the coefficients
Bt oF ,H, V, W, and Y are defined below:
B~lts
C~ctszrshfsh
D~rhsfhs
E~rshfsh
F~chzrhsfhs
H~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
(C{F)
2z4eE
q
V~eE{A2zACzAF{CF
W~A{F
Y~2A{C{F
Combining Equations 14, 16 with Equation 9 (10), the total
exposure dose from time t1 to t2 can be written in terms of the
amount of pathogens released (Equation 17).
doset~doseinhzdoseing
~
ðt2
t1
(
Inh
Vol
MairzrhmfhmMh)dt
~Mair0
2BEH
CzF
(C{2AzF){
2(C{AzF)H
Hz(CzF) ½ 
2e
CzFzH
2 tHV
" (
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(C{2AzF){
2(C{AzF)H
H{(CzF) ½ 
2e
CzF{H
2 tHV
#
{(
G
A
{
BEH
AV
)e{At
)         
t2
t1
ð17Þ
where the coefficients represented by G and H are listed below:
G~
Inh
V
H~rhmfhm
The overall risk is composed of inhalation risk and ingestion
risk. In this work it is assumed that these two types of risk are
independent of each other; in this case the overall risk is expressed
in Equation 18:
Riskoverall~1{(1{Riskinh)(1{Risking) ð18Þ
In reality there is little evidence to assess the joint effects of
inhalation and ingestion exposures, but this assumption is
probably most defensible at low risk levels when the probability
of successful colonization by both routes is low.
Equations 17 and 18 solve the forward problem of estimating
risk from a known release amount. The inverse problem is to
estimate the release amount from measured environmental
concentrations. The amount of released pathogens (Mair0), can
be estimated by Equation 15, if the number of pathogens
deposited on the touched surfaces (Mts) can be acquired from
surface sampling and the time after release (t) is known. However,
the mass on touched surface is influenced by many parameters
such as touch rate and transfer rate, which are generally highly
uncertain. The mass on the untracked floor is most suitable for
estimating the release quantity as it provides an integration of air
concentration values over time without human interference. This
can be obtained by taking the expression from the fourth row of
Equation 4 and substituting Equation 14 for Mair:
dMutf
dt
~lutfe{AtMairo{cutfMutf ð19Þ
and integrating it to give the release quantity, where tm stands for
the elapsed time when measurements are taken:
Mairo~
Mutf(A{cutf)
lutf e
{cutf tm{e{Atm
   ð20Þ
Once the release quantity (Mair0) is known, Equations 11, 12,
17, and 18 can be used to estimate risk. Concentrations in the
compartments omitted from Equation 13 (i.e., the compartments
that do not transfer microbes to other compartments, namely
HVAC filters, walls, nasal passages, and the external compart-
ments) can be obtained by integrating the produce of the air
concentration and the transfer rates from the air over time.
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considers a case where the initial aerosol release has dissipated.
However, the time scale for attenuation of microbes can be much
longer on surfaces than in the air (i.e, pathogens on surfaces are not
subject to attenuation by deposition or by air exchange with the
exterior of the building). Thus much of the longer term risk to
occupants will come from microbes on surfaces as surface can both
serve as a reservoir for re-suspension into the air compartment and for
exposure via fomite contact. In such cases surfaces could be sampled
to assess whether a building is suitable for re-occupancy. Thus, the
prospective scenario can be thought of as a re-occupancy assessment.
The initial conditions are that Category A pathogens are present on
the touched surfaces in a quantity equal to the area of the touched
surfaces (Asurf) multiplied by the corresponding concentration (Csurf),
which would be estimated from surface sampling (Equation 21). Thus
the initial conditions can be expressed as:
Init~
Mair
Mts
Mtf
Mh
2
6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 5
~
0
CtsAts
0
0
2
6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 5
ð21Þ
Due to the longer time scale associated with the prospective
scenario, human-caused resuspension cannot be omitted. Thus,
the tracked floor compartment is included in the system of
equations to be solved:
Mair
.
Mts
.
Mtf
.
Mh
.
0
B B B B B B B @
1
C C C C C C C A
~
{A mm 0
lts  (mzctszrshfsh)0 r hsfhs
ltf 0  (mzctf)0
0r shfsh 0  (chzrhsfhs)
0
B B B B B @
1
C C C C C A
Mair
Mts
Mtf
Mh
0
B B B B B @
1
C C C C C A
ð22Þ
After acquiring the concentrations of the pathogen on different
surfaces over time (based on Equation 2), the total exposure dose
can be calculated via integration. To conservatively estimate
exposure dosage, one may use the maximum exposure duration
which is achieved if t1=0 and t2=‘.
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The equations derived in this section provide the exposure input
for dose-response models (Equations 11 and 12) and thereby link
the surface concentration of a pathogen with an occupant’s future
risk. This procedure is shown in Information S1, and Equations 24
and 25 (25a is for ingestion risk, 25b is for dermal contact risk;
schematic figures are provided in Figures S1 and S2) are the
resulting approximate solutions for the exponential dose-response
model at low doses (i.e., where the Taylor series approximation is
accurate. A Comparison between approximated equations and
simulated results is provided in Information S1, table 1):
riskretro~1{(1{riskinh retro)(1{risking retro)
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where rhmfhm is set to 1 for dermal contact, A is defined by
Equation 5, and Qpros, and Qhand are given by:
wpros~mzctszrshfsh ð26Þ
whand ing~rhmfhmzctszrhsfhs ð27aÞ
whand dermal~ctszrhsfhs ð27bÞ
For the beta-Poisson model these equations would hold at low
dose, except that R would be replaced by a/b. At higher doses
(where the Taylor series linearization does not hold) one would
compute the exposure dose using Equations K and N from
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response model.
2.5 Model Inputs
Environmental decay rates, best fit dose-response models, and
dose response parameters for different pathogens are listed in
Tables 1 and 2, while other parameters such as the dimensions of
the room, the operational parameters of the HVAC system, the
deposition velocities of released pathogens, etc. are included in
Information S2, table 2). Since the particle size of a pathogen
affects its deposition velocity, resuspension rate, filter removal, and
even dose-response coefficient [32], this study considers four
different aerodynamic diameters: 1 mM, 3 mM, 5 mM, and 10 mM.
Results
Figure 2 presents the inhalation, ingestion and overall risks
associated with the aerosol release (i.e., the retrospective scenario)
of 1 micron Category A pathogens. The overall risk and inhalation
risk match so closely as to be indistinguishable in the graph,
indicating that risk from inhalation is the main component of
overall risk. Particle deposition drives the time required for this risk
to reach steady state. Hence, the time to reach this asymptote is
the same for different pathogens of the same size.
Figure 3 presents different types of risks associated with the
presence of 1 micron Category A pathogens on surfaces (i.e., the
prospective scenario). In this case total risk and ingestion risk
match so closely as to be indistinguishable, indicating that risk
from ingestion (dermal contact for B. anthracis) is the main
component of overall risk. In Figure 3, the time scale over which
each pathogen’s overall risk reaches its asymptote varies over 4
orders of magnitude, which can be explained by the huge
variability among pathogen attenuation rates.
To summarize which exposure routes dominate under which
conditions, Figure 4 presents the ratio of accumulated inhalation
and ingestion exposure. If pathogens are aerosolized (retrospective
scenario), the dominant exposure route is inhalation (see also
Figure 2), because inhalation is more significant for small particle
sizes, which remain in the air longer before settling. If pathogens
are initially present on a surface (prospective scenario), the
dominant exposure route is ingestion (see also Figure 3), and this
trend is most significant for small particle sizes as they are least
prone to resuspension.
3.1 Linking pathogen concentrations to risk
Another application of the model is to link measured pathogen
concentrations on the surfaces with health risk. In the case of a
persistent pathogen, a surface concentration reflects a fraction of
the integral of the air concentration (provided there has been no
resuspension from the surface). In contrast, for a pathogen subject
to environmental decay, surface concentrations reflect both the
integrated air concentrations and surface decay over time. The
relationship between surface concentration and accumulated
(retrospective) dose changes as pathogen concentrations attenuate
on the surface over time. As deposited microbes decay, each
surviving microbe becomes indicative of a larger number having
been present previously. Figure 5, which depicts the retrospective
risk for a concentration of 10 pathogens per m
2 on an HVAC
filter, illustrates this. If one finds the concentration of Lassa virus
particles is 10 pathogens per m
2 with a diameter of 1 mmo na n
HVAC system filter 1 hour after a release, this implies that
occupants were subject to a risk of 1.0610
23 due to the past
1 hour of exposure. The same concentration found 4 hours after
the release would imply a risk close to 1.0610
22, as fewer of the
deposited virus remain viable after 4 hours. In reality it may not be
realistic to detect pathogens in the environment on anything
approaching the time scale of several hours, but this serves as an
example of how great a challenge it is to use environmental
samples to characterize risks associated with a pathogen that
attenuates in the environment. In contrast risks associated a given
concentration of B. anthracis (a persistent microbe) are relatively
constant over time.
The results of this modeling can be summarized in a series of
charts that link surface concentration to previous exposure risk for
Table 2. Best Fit Dose-Response Model.
Pathogen
Strain
information
Exposed animal
and route
Dose-response
function type
Best-fit Virulence
coefficient
a
Uncertainty ranges of
virulence coefficients
(95% Confidence Interval)
Uncertainty distributions
and parameter used for
virulence coefficients
b Source
B. anthracis
c ATCC 6605 Female Hartley guinea
pigs (250 to 300 g),
intranasal
Exponential 7.15610
26 (6.26610
26, 7.43610
26) Normal distribution
(m=6.93610
26,
s=3.98610
27)
[59]
Y. pestis CO92 C57BL/6 mice,
intranasal
Exponential 1.02610
23 (9.87610
24, 1.05610
23) Normal distribution
(m=1.02610
23,
s=1.91610
25)
[23]
F. tularensis SCHU S-4 Monkey (4000–5000 g),
aerosol
Exponential 5.32610
22 (5.28610
22, 5.36610
22) Normal distribution
(m=5.32610
22,
s=2.22610
24)
[60]
d
Variola major Yamada Swiss Webster albino
mice (age from 2 hr to 6
days), intraperitoneal
Beta-Poisson 2.31610
26 (8.19610
27, 4.80610
26) Normal distribution
(m=2.65610
26,
s=1.21610
26)
[61]
e
Lassa NA pigs (180 to 300 g),
aerosol
Beta-Poisson 3.58610
22 (4.16610
24, 5.59610
21) Log-Normal distribution
(mln=21.69, sln=0.80)
[57]
f
aIn exponential dose-response model, R is used as virulence coefficient, while in beta-Poisson dose-response model, the ratio of a/b is used as virulence coefficient.
bThe distributions are fitted to bootstrap samples of dose response parameters using @RISK [62].
cThe intestinal risk is replaced by cutaneous risk since the fractions of inhalational anthrax and cutaneous anthrax were the same in the 2001 anthrax letters attacks [6].
dThe data for 2.1 mm particles are used.
eThe data for 4.5 mm or less in diameter are used.
fThe data for the age group of 5 days and above are used.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.t002
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and Y. Pestis, while the rest are provided in the Information S3,
Figures S3, S4, and S5). The difference between curves for the
same pathogen for different time periods reflects the environmen-
tal persistence of the pathogen. A rapidly decaying pathogen will
have widely separated curves to reflect that the same concentration
of pathogens remaining after a longer time period implies a higher
exposure risk (i.e., each pathogen remaining indicates that a
greater number were present during the earlier part of the
exposure period), while a persistent pathogen will have closely
spaced curves as the risk to concentration relationship is relatively
constant over time.
There are essentially two options for addressing prospective (re-
occupancy) risk, restrict access to the contaminated site until
pathogen concentrations decline to acceptable levels through
natural attenuation or actively decontaminate the site. The
selection of a strategy depends on the survival capability of the
pathogens. If the passive decontamination approach is chosen, the
time required depends on the initial concentration to reach a given
residual risk target, but one can get a rough idea of the relative
feasibility of this approach by comparing the time to achieve a
significant concentration reduction across different pathogens. The
time scale for a 6-log risk reduction due to natural attenuation for
different pathogens is shown in Table 3. Values in Table 3 vary by
more than 4 orders of magnitude. B. anthracis has a best estimate of
17,100 days or over 46 years. It is probably more appropriate to
compare the upper bound as pathogens will reside in a wide
variety of different microenvironments and decay rates would be
expected to vary among microenvironments. Decontamination
would only be achieved once even the pathogens in the more
protected microenvironments have decayed. For B. anthracis this
upper bound would be over 82 years. In contrast, a greater than 6
order of magnitude decay of Lassa would occur in less than a day.
These estimates are very sensitive to the assumption of log linear
decay. Deviations from log linear decay are widely reported.
However in many cases a biphasic approach could be adopted in
which a rapid log-linear decay rate is used for the first several days
and a second, lower log-linear decay rate is used subsequently.
While parameters for such biphasic attenuation models are not yet
available for these pathogens, the approach presented here can be
readily adapted to biphasic decay. The relevant equations would
be unchanged, but the mass distribution in each compartment at
the end of the first phase would constitute the initial conditions for
the second phase.
Figure 2. Different types of risks associated with aerosol release of 1 micron Category A pathogens. (Release quantity is 1000
unclumped pathogens. For B. anthracis, the ingestion risk is replaced by cutaneous risk since the fractions of inhalational anthrax and cutaneous
anthrax were the same in the 2001 anthrax letters attacks [6]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.g002
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with a 1 in 1000 risk. Concentrations corresponding to different
risk levels can be found by multiplying these values by the desired
risk level/10
23, provided that the risk is low enough to be
approximately a linear function of exposure (which is roughly
accurate for risks ,10
22). In the retrospective scenarios (the first
two columns), the concentrations become lower (standards would
become more stringent) as the time after the release increases.
Values for B. anthracis presented here are substantially lower than
reported previously [12], as the previous study considered only
inhalation risk, while this study considers dermal risk as well as
inhalation risk for B. anthracis. Even if sampling could be conducted
within 24 hours (which is an extremely optimistic assumption), it
would be difficult to characterize risk at the 1 in 1,000 level for any
of the pathogens, as this would require quantifying pathogens at
levels ranging from 5–7 pathogens/m
2 for Variola major to 10–11/
m
2 for Lassa.
For the prospective case (columns 3–5), if a pathogen decays
rapidly, most of the risk will attenuate relatively rapidly. In such
cases a much less stringent concentration standard can be set if
access to the building is restricted for a period after the sampling is
conducted. The differences in values for different Category A
pathogens are driven by virulence and environmental persistency,
which are both pathogen dependent. B. anthracis has relatively high
concentrations despite being very persistent, because it has a
relatively low infectivity (proportional to parameter k from dose-
response functions). The strictest concentration values are for F.
tularensis despite its low persistence because of its high infectivity.
The concentrations associated with immediate re-occupancy are
in many cases well below applicable limits of detection. For
example a negative sampling result for Lassa, used to estimate the
prospective risk for immediate occupancy, would not provide
much confidence because the applicable standard of 9 organisms
per m
2 is well below feasible detection levels. However, a negative
result coupled with a 24-hour restriction on access would provide
some level of confidence as the standard for this case of 7.36610
8
organisms per m
2 is readily detectable. In this latter case,
demonstrating achievement of a risk target of 1 in a million (a
concentration of 7.36610
5 organisms per m
2 or 73.6 organisms
per cm
2) would likely be feasible as well. If one assumes that a
0.09 m
2 surface is sampled with a recovery of 0.38 [12,33], and a
detection limit of 10 organisms, then the resulting minimum
Figure 3. Different types of risks associated with surface release of 1 micron Category A pathogens. (Release quantity is 1000
unclumped pathogens. For B. anthracis, the ingestion risk is replaced by cutaneous risk since the fractions of inhalational anthrax and cutaneous
anthrax were the same in the 2001 anthrax letters attacks [6]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.g003
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2.
Table 5 compares risks associated with this concentration across
different organisms.
3.2 Parameter uncertainties
Another objective of this study is to compare risk and
uncertainties across different pathogens. The development of
explicit formulae for exposure, that is Equations 24 and 25a(b),
greatly simplifies uncertainty analysis. Using the input distributions
listed in Table 1 and Table 2 with Equations 24 and 25a(b), a
Monte Carlo analysis was carried out using to propagate
uncertainties in input parameters through to uncertainties in risks
for different pathogens. Results from retrospective and prospective
scenarios are presented in the form of box plots (Figure 8). The
relative risk presented by different pathogens in an air release are
largely determined by their dose-response parameters, because the
exposure duration in air is limited by the particle deposition rate
(which is the same across different pathogens) rather than the
decay rate. However, air decay rate does have an impact, when
decay is rapid enough to occur over the time scale during which
particulates are typically suspended (minutes to hours depending
on the diameter of the particles) which is the case for Y. pestis, F.
tularensis, and Lassa.,The relative risks for different pathogens in a
surface release are affected by both fomite decay rates and dose-
response parameters. In general the risk from releasing the same
amount of pathogens can be ranked as Lassa, F. tularensis, Y. Pestis,
B. anthracis, and Variola major (in decreasing order). This analysis
does not include secondary transmission risks (which may be
particularly important for all but B. anthracis and F. tularensis [34])
and as such does not capture a critical component of risk for
pathogens, such as Variola major, which are subject to secondary
transmission. Instead it addresses the question as to which
pathogens are subject to the greatest uncertainty in setting surface
concentration standards for primary exposure. Uncertainties
presented by Lassa are highest across most of the cases (extending
over roughly an order of magnitude), indicating that this organism
may be a priority for further study (pending consideration of
factors such as its likely use in an attack).
Correlations between the input parameter values and the model
output (risk) are used to assess the importance of uncertainties in
different parameters. These correlations were computed separately
for each pathogen, for ingestion and inhalation risk for both the
retrospective and prospective scenarios for all four particle sizes
considered. Table 6 summarizes the 3 most important uncertain
inputs by exposure pathway and scenario for each pathogen (with
the range of values across the four particle sizes shown in brackets).
Detailed results are included in the Information S4, tables 3–7).
Uncertainties in mass transfer fraction from surface to hand (fsh)
Figure 4. The ratio of accumulative inhalation and ingestion exposure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.g004
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breathing rate (Inh) plays an important role in determining the
inhalation dose in the retrospective scenario. In the prospective
scenario, the ingestion dose is most closely related to the mass
transfer fraction from surface to hand (fsh), while the inhalation
dose is most closely related to the pathogen resuspension rate (m2).
As noted above this analysis captures only one aspect of
uncertainty, that of uncertainty in primary exposure. This may be
the appropriate framework for pathogens that are not subject to
secondary transmission as well as for decisions where one seeks to
cut off environmental transmission of a pathogen after a
widespread environmental contamination event. Additional risk
and uncertainty would be applicable for decisions where
secondary transmission is a concern.
Discussion
This study presents an integrated fate and transport, dose-
response model to estimate the inhalation and ingestion risks
associated with environmental pathogens. Scenarios to estimate
the past risk and to predict future risk are introduced. A reduced
form model is developed and used to compare risks and
uncertainties for different pathogens. Efforts to develop an
internet-based platform for the dissemination of microbial risk
assessment tools such as this are in progress (http://wiki.camra.
msu.edu/index.php?title=Main_Page).
In addition, this study also identified important parameter
uncertainties in risk assessment models. Specifically, the input-
output correlations presented in Table 6 indicate which parameter
uncertainties have the greatest effect on risk estimates. However,
several other factors must be considered in settling research
priorities. Whether the high correlation is due to variability or
epistemic uncertainty is one such factor. Parameters such as
inhalation rate and air exchange rate will vary considerably from
person to person and from building to building, respectively.
However, they are not subject to great epistemic uncertainty. The
ranges within these parameters vary have already been well
characterized. Additional research would not reduce the inherent
variability in such parameters but only serve to further
characterize an already well-characterized variability distribution.
Another factor to consider is whether a particular parameter is
common across pathogens such that a study of a single surrogate
organism might be helpful in improving risk assessments for
multiple pathogens. Strictly speaking, any parameter can be
Figure 5. Relationship between risks to the exposed people and pathogen concentration identified from the HVAC filter. (A
concentration of 10 organisms/m
2 was found at HVAC filter at different time after an aerosol release.).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.g005
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perhaps be made between dose-response parameters and envi-
ronmental decay rates, both of which are observed to vary over
orders of magnitude and depend on very complex pathogen-host
and pathogen-environment interactions, and general physical
transfer rates, such as surface-hand and hand-surface transfer
fractions and re-aerosolization rates, which might vary less from
pathogen to pathogen.
A third consideration is the extent to which an uncertainty is
reducible by further research. Dose-response is an example of an
uncertainty that is difficult to reduce through research. In part this
is due to cost, as such research generally requires vertebrate
animals and extensive biosafety precautions. There are other more
fundamental challenges as well. Laboratory experiments 1) must
be conducted at high doses with limited numbers of animals,
leaving great uncertainty as to the effects of lower doses; 2)
generally do not consider the effects of previous exposures, which
might greatly affect the dose response coefficients; and 3) must be
conducted with animal models that may not accurately represent
human dose response. Despite these limitations, further animal
studies would at least reduce the confidence intervals for the dose-
response parameters used here. These dose-response model
parameter uncertainties are the uncertainties reflected in the
correlations summarized in Table 6 (i.e., applicability of the
animal model to humans and validity of extrapolation from high to
low dose were not addressed by this analysis), which means that
further animal dosing studies would effectively reduce the
uncertainty considered here. Thus, dose-response uncertainty is
considered by the authors to be researchable, although the
difficulties and expense of working with vertebrate animals with
extensive biosafety precautious are significant.
As an example of how one might integrate these different factors,
Table 7 summarizes the authors’ view of future research priorities
based on these different factors. In Table 7, The percentages in the
right hand columns indicate the frequencywith which theparameter
was one of the top three sources of uncertainty for different
pathogens (the retrospective scenario percentages are based on
inhalation risk, and the prospective scenario percentages are based
on ingestion risk). A low research priority for research is assigned to
all three parameters subject to variability rather than epistemic
uncertainty: breathing rate, density, and air exchange rate. The
remaining 6 parameters all were judged to be subject to epistemic
uncertainty. The degree of ‘‘Generality’’ (divided into 3 categories in
order of priority: common across pathogens, similarities expected,
pathogen specific) was an important factor in distinguishing among
high and medium priority parameters, with both of the medium
Figure 6. Retrospective risks associated with B. anthracis HVAC concentrations after an aerosol release.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.g006
Prioritizing Risks of Category A Pathogens
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 13 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e32732priority parameters (decay on fomites and decay in the air)
considered to be pathogen specific. Three of the high priority
parameters (resuspension rate, hand surface contact rate, and mass
transfer fraction for surface to hand) were ranked highly partly
because similarities across organisms would be expected making
surrogate research more generally relevant and partly because the
input-output correlations indicated they were important parameters.
Dose-response parameters were given high priority for research
despite being judged both pathogen-specific and difficult to research,
because these parameters were relatively frequently among the
parameters responsible for the greatest uncertainty in risk (13% of
retrospective cases and 20% of prospective cases).
Judgments listed in Table 7 are all based on the authors’
understanding and previous experience. The intent is to provide
an example framework for integrating the computational results
provided by the model with broader considerations that influence
the costs and benefits expected from future research. The sources
of input into this ranking process should be broadened by
scientifically collecting opinions from experts in the future [35].
The fate and transport model is based on the assumption that
pathogens are instantly uniformly mixed in a compartment. This
fails to capture the short-term dynamics associated with the
immediate vicinity of a release. For example, surface samples might
not be reflective of the localized high concentrations associated with
opening a letter containing pathogens and might underestimate risk
in this case. A more detailed approach, such as computational fluid
dynamics, would be a useful extension to this study.
The study also considers risk from a release of only one
pathogen. Little information is available on the effects of mixtures
of pathogens. This approach would be most valid at low risk levels
when interactions among pathogens, such as successful coloniza-
tion by more than one pathogen would be unlikely.
Figure 7. Cumulative retrospective risks associated with Y. pestis HVAC concentrations after an aerosol release.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.g007
Table 3. Time scale for a 6-log risk reduction due to natural
attenuation.
Pathogen Time (days)
Min Max Best estimate
B. anthracis 1.24610
4 3.00610
4 1.71610
4
Y. pestis 4.63610
21 1.44610
1 1.27
F. tularensis 1.25 5.75610
1 2.41
Variola major 5.79610
1 1.05610
2 8.38610
1
Lassa 6.25610
21 8.46610
21 7.50610
21
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.t003
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the host is log linear over time. In reality microorganisms often
exhibit ‘‘tailing’’ in which a small, highly resistant subpopulation
attenuates at a very low rate. Thus the assumption of log-linear
decay may not be health protective. Accordingly the values
calculated here are not intended as suggested environmental
standards. These calculations are provided to illustrate the
suggested approach and to allow a comparison of uncertainties
so that future research can be prioritized.
This study modeled environmental fate and transport using a
small number of homogeneous compartments when in reality
surfaces may vary in characteristics, such as the frequency with
which they are touched, the rate at which pathogens attenuate
(influenced in turn by relative humidity, intensity of ultraviolet
light, etc. [10]), and the ease with which pathogens are re-
aerosolized or transferred to hands from them. Modeling these
heterogeneities may improve our understanding of pathogen fate
and transport in the environment but would require detailed
parameter inputs beyond what are currently available in the
literature. Such heterogeneities might provide protected microen-
vironments that could allow pathogens to persist longer and
present greater health risks than estimated here, which makes this
a priority for future research.
The framework developed here may help inform whether active
decontamination is required after a release. If a pathogen with a
slow environmental attenuation rate is released (i.e., B. anthracis),
then environmental decontamination may be required. In
contrast, if a pathogen with fast environmental attenuation rate
is released (eg., Lassa), the decision maker may opt to restrict
access to the contaminated site until the residual risk declines to a
level judged acceptable for re-occupancy. The choice between
Table 4. Concentrations of pathogens on horizontal surfaces associated with risk of 10
23 (Prospective exposure duration=1 year).
Pathogen Diameter Concentrations (organisms/m
2)
Retrospective
sampling 8 hours
after release
Retrospective
sampling 24 hours
after release
Prospective for
immediate
occupancy
Prospective after
24 hours access
restriction
Prospective after
48 hours access
restriction
B. anthracis 1 mM 1.63 1.73610
21 2.98610
1 2.98610
1 2.98610
1
3 mM 4.15 4.38610
21 6.44610
2 6.74610
2 7.09610
2
5 mM 7.40 7.65610
21 1.88610
3 2.02610
3 2.20610
3
10 mM 1.63610
1 1.42 7.62610
3 1.23610
4 2.11610
4
Y. pestis 1 mM 2.60610
23 1.36610
26 1.79610
2 8.99610
6 4.91610
11
3 mM 9.80610
23 2.47610
26 1.78610
2 9.27610
6 5.34610
11
5 mM 1.26610
22 2.51610
26 1.76610
2 9.46610
6 5.87610
11
10 mM 1.24610
22 1.72610
26 1.75610
2 1.81610
7 2.03610
12
F. tularensis 1 mM 2.39610
24 2.70610
26 1.72 5.08610
2 1.60610
5
3 mM 7.62610
24 4.28610
26 1.72 5.28610
2 1.73610
5
5 mM 9.02610
24 4.17610
26 1.72 5.34610
2 1.82610
5
10 mM 8.23610
24 2.75610
26 1.79 1.09610
3 7.03610
5
Variola major 1 mM 3.12610
1 7.00 1.12610
3 1.38610
3 1.62610
3
3 mM 7.35610
1 7.69 1.35610
3 1.76610
3 2.17610
3
5 mM 8.01610
1 7.80 1.60610
3 2.17610
3 2.74610
3
10 mM 7.49610
1 5.84 4.77610
3 1.15610
4 2.59610
3
Lassa 1 mM 6.61610
26 1.94610
211 8.93 7.36610
8 7.32610
16
3 mM 2.28610
25 4.39610
211 8.93 7.93610
8 8.05610
16
5 mM 3.97610
25 4.90610
211 9.11 8.26610
8 8.86610
16
10 mM 4.02610
25 3.25610
211 8.45 1.49610
9 3.03610
17
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.t004
Table 5. Equipment detection limit associated risk*.
Pathogen Diameter Risk (95% confidence interval)
B. anthracis 1 mM 2.30610
22 (5.81610
24, 4.33610
21)
3 mM 6.80610
24 (2.25610
25, 6.54610
23)
5 mM 1.92610
24 (1.00610
25, 1.16610
23)
10 mM 1.17610
25 (3.18610
26, 2.84610
24)
Y. pestis 1 mM 2.86610
23 (9.63610
25, 1.63610
22)
3 mM 2.85610
23 (1.01610
24, 1.58610
22)
5 mM 2.84610
23 (1.04610
24, 1.51610
22)
10 mM 2.69610
23 (1.04610
24, 1.37610
22)
F. tularensis 1 mM 2.57610
21 (1.54610
22, 9.17610
21)
3 mM 2.55610
21 (1.58610
22, 8.96610
21)
5 mM 2.54610
21 (1.60610
22, 8.65610
21)
10 mM 2.31610
21 (1.56610
22, 8.06610
21)
Variola major 1 mM 2.79610
24 (9.72610
26, 6.10610
24)
3 mM 2.43610
24 (7.84610
26, 5.06610
24)
5 mM 2.14610
24 (5.93610
26, 4.06610
24)
10 mM 7.35610
25 (3.42610
26, 3.32610
24)
Lassa 1 mM 5.43610
22 (1.04610
22, 7.00610
21)
3 mM 5.43610
22 (1.09610
22, 7.00610
21)
5 mM 5.42610
22 (1.12610
22, 6.99610
21)
10 mM 5.26610
22 (1.12610
22, 6.95610
21)
*It is assumed that the detection limit is 10 organisms which comes from
sampling a 0.09 m
2 surface with the pathogen concentration 292 organisms
per m
2 and the recovery rate is 0.38 [12].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.t005
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Pathogen Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario
Ingestion risk Inhalation risk Ingestion risk Inhalation risk
B. anthracis Dose-response coefficient (r) (0.66–
0.76)
Air change rate (ACH) (0.31–0.72) Dose-response coefficient (r) (0.63–
0.87)
Air change rate (ACH) (0.44–0.75)
Mass transfer fraction from
surface to hand (fsh) (0.21–0.36)
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.27–0.65) Mass transfer fraction from surface
to hand (fsh) (0.16–0.32)
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.14–0.53)
Air change rate (ACH) (0.081–0.21) Density of the particle (rp) (0.052–0.61) Resuspension rate (m2) (0.047, 0.29) Resuspension rate (m2) (0.022–0.32)
Y. pestis Decay rate on fomite (cf) (0.56–0.61) Breathing rate (Inh) (0.73–0.78) Decay rate on fomite (cf) (0.53–0.56) Decay rate on fomite (cf) (0.51–0.63)
Mass transfer fraction from surface
to hand (fsh) (0.47–0.51)
Air change rate (ACH) (0.28–0.52) Mass transfer fraction from surface
to hand (fsh) (0.34–0.38)
Resuspension rate (m2) (0.21–0.35)
Density of the particle (rp) (0.12–0.24) Density of the particle (rp)
(0.026–0.54)
Hand-surface contacting rate (rhs)
(0.071–0.079)
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.15–0.18)
F. tularensis Mass transfer fraction from surface
to hand (fsh) (0.44–0.67)
Decay rate in the air (cair)
(0.46–0.75)
Decay rate on fomite (cf) (0.64–0.65) Decay rate on fomite (cf) (0.42–0.59)
Decay rate in the air (cair) (0.23–0.43) Breathing rate (Inh) (0.35–0.69) Mass transfer fraction from surface
to hand (fsh) (0.41–0.47)
Resuspension rate (m2) (0.18–0.33)
Decay rate on fomite (cf) (0.33–0.49) Decay rate on fomite (cf)
(0.18–0.42)
Hand-surface contacting rate (rhs)
(0.12–0.13)
Decay rate in the air (cair) (0.14–0.26)
Variola major Mass transfer fraction from surface
to hand (fsh) (0.45–0.67)
Dose-response coefficient (r) (0.44–
0.73)
Mass transfer fraction from surface
to hand (fsh) (0.60–0.67)
Dose-response coefficient (r) (0.30–
0.61)
Dose-response coefficient (r) (0.38–
0.54)
Air change rate (ACH) (0.19–0.54) Dose-response coefficient (r)
(0.51–0.57)
Air change rate (ACH) (0.25–0.45)
Air change rate (ACH) (0.11–0.37) Breathing rate (Inh) (0.25–0.40) Resuspension rate (m2) (0.15–0.46) Resuspension rate (m2) (0.25–0.39)
Lassa Dose-response coefficient (r) (0.60–
0.70)
Dose-response coefficient (r) (0.69–
0.87)
Dose-response coefficient (r) (0.72) Dose-response coefficient (r) (0.61–
0.80)
Mass transfer fraction from surface
to hand (fsh) (0.40–0.47)
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.26–0.28) Mass transfer fraction from surface
to hand (fsh) (0.51)
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.17–0.23)
Decay rate in the air (cair) (0.057–0.21) Decay rate in the air (cair) (0.082–0.31) Resuspension rate (m2) (0.26–0.40) Decay rate in the air (cair) (0.089–0.24)
Correlation coefficients between selected parameters and risks. Correlations were computed separately for each of four modeled particle sizes (1, 3, 5, and 10 mM diameter
particles), and the smallest and the largest coefficients across the four modeled particle sizes are listed in the brackets. (Raw data are included in Information S4).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.t006
Table 7. Properties of parameters uncertainty.
Authors’
priority Parameter Symbol
Uncertainty
vs. Variability Generality Researchable
Percentage in the top 3
uncertainty parameters
among retrospective
scenario (%)
+
Percentage in the top 3
uncertainty parameters
among prospective
scenario (%)
+
High Mass transfer fraction
from surface to hand
fsh Both Similarities expected Yes 0 33
High Dose-response
coefficients
k Both Pathogen specific Difficult 13 20
High Resuspension rate m2 Both Similarities expected Yes 0 20
High Hand-surface
contacting rate
rhs Both Similarities expected Yes 0 13
Moderate Decay rate on fomite cf Both Pathogen specific Yes 7 13
Moderate Decay rate in the air cair Both Pathogen specific Yes 13 0
Low Breathing rate Inh Variability Common across
pathogen
Yes 33 0
Low Air change rate ACH Variability Common across
pathogen
Yes 20 0
Low Density of the particle rp Variability Common across
pathogen
Yes
* 13 0
*Density can readily be measured but it is not clear that laboratory values could reflect density in an actual release.
+The percentages in the retrospective scenario are based on inhalation risk in the retrospective scenario, while the percentages in the prospective scenario are based on
ingestion risk in the prospective scenario of Table 6.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.t007
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ing the costs of remediation and opportunity costs of restricting
access to the building. While previous research has addressed
policy options for bioterrorism, this research has not considered
the opportunity costs of removing buildings from service [36,37].
Thus, further study is needed to inform the choice between active
remediation and passive attenuation.
This analysis considered viable organisms. However, the
environmental concentrations which would be used as inputs to
the risk models developed here would likely be measured by
quantitative PCR (qPCR), which has been proven effective in
quantifying biological warfare agents (i.e., B. antracis, and Y. pestis)
due to its rapid, early, and accurate results [38]. Despite the
advantages of qPCR analysis, several knowledge gaps need to be
addressed The first is that the qPCR does not distinguish between
living or dead pathogens. While researchers have identified assays
to discriminate between viable and dead fecal bacteroidales bacteria,
similar methods have not been applied to Category A pathogens
[39,40]. Second there is little information on the decay of the
qPCR signal over time, which would be an essential parameter for
the retrospective assessment of risk after a release. Thus, studies
are needed to quantify parameters such as, the efficiency of DNA
extraction, the degradation of nucleic acids overtime, and the
reactivity of primer and probe [33,41,42].
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Pathogen flow for estimating the inhalation
dose in the prospective scenario.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Pathogen flow for estimating the ingestion
dose in the prospective scenario.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Cumulative retrospective risks associated with
F. tularensis HVAC concentrations after anaerosol release.
(TIF)
Figure S4 Cumulative retrospective risks associated
with Variola major HVAC concentrations after an
aerosol release.
(TIF)
Figure S5 Cumulative retrospective risks associated
withLassa HVAC concentrations after an aerosol release.
(TIF)
Figure 8. Risk and uncertainty for different pathogens associated with an aerosol release over 8 hours (retrospective scenario) and
with a surface release over an infinite time (prospective scenario). Medians shown in red, 1
st and 3
rd quartiles in blue. For input uncertainty
distributions see Tables 1–2 of the main text and Information S2, table 2. (1. B. anthracis,2 .Y. pestis,3 .F. tularensis,4 .Variola major, and 5. Lassa).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032732.g008
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ated with pathogens (F. tularensis, Variola major and
Lassa) HVAC concentrations after an aerosol release.
(DOC)
Information S4 Correlation coefficients between input
parameters and different pathogens.
(DOC)
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: TH YH PLG CNH. Performed the
experiments: TH YH. Analyzed the data: TH YH PLG. Contributed
reagents/materials/analysis tools: TH YH PLG CNH. Wrote the paper: TH
PLG.
References
1. Waterer GW, Robertson H (2009) Bioterrorism for the respiratory physician.
Respirology 14: 5–11.
2. Pohanka M, Skladal P (2009) Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis and
Yersinia pestis. The most important bacterial warfare agents - review. Folia
Microbiologica 54: 263–272.
3. Webb GF (2003) A silent bomb: The risk of anthrax as a weapon of mass
destruction. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America 100: 4355–4356.
4. Sabelnikov A, Zhukov V, Kempf CR (2006) Airborne exposure limits for
chemical and biological warfare agents: Is everything set and clear? International
Journal of Environmental Health Research 16: 241–253.
5. Block SM (2002) The growing threat of biological weapons. Molecular Biology
of the Cell 13: 3–11.
6. Lesperance A (2008) Catastrophic Incident Recovery: Long-Term Recovery
from an Anthrax Event Symposium. Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory.
7. CLTV website. Cleanup of anthrax will cost hundreds of millions of dollars.
Available: http://cltv.trb.com/entertainment/bal-te.anthrax18-
dec18,1,1593731.story.
8. Hong T (2009) Estimating Risk of Exposure to Bacillus Anthracis based on
Environmental Concentration. Philadelphia: Drexel.
9. Sextro RG, Lorenzetti DM, Sohn MD, Thatcher TL (2002) Modeling the
spread of anthrax in buildings. Proceedings of the Indoor Air 2002 Conference.
Monterey, CA, . pp 506–511.
10. Sinclair R, Boone SA, Greenberg D, Keim P, Gerba CP (2008) Persistence of
category A select agents in the environment. Applied and Environmental
Microbiology 74: 555–563.
11. Price PN, Sohn MD, Lacommare KSH, McWilliams JA (2009) Framework for
evaluating anthrax risk in buildings. Environmental Science & Technology 43:
1783–1787.
12. Hong T, Gurian PL, Ward NFD (2010) Setting Risk-Informed Environmental
Standards for Bacillus Anthracis Spores. Risk Analysis 30: 1602–1622.
13. Tellier R (2009) Aerosol transmission of influenza A virus: a review of new
studies. Journal of the Royal Society Interface 6: S783–S790.
14. Wein LM, Atkinson MP (2009) Assessing Infection Control Measures for
Pandemic Influenza. Risk Analysis 29: 949–962.
15. Atkinson MP, Wein LM (2008) Quantifying the routes of transmission for
pandemic influenza. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 70: 820–867.
16. Nicas M, Gang S (2006) An integrated model of infection risk in a health-care
environment. Risk Analysis 26: 1085–1096.
17. Nicas M, Best D (2008) A study quantifying the hand-to-face contact rate and its
potential application to predicting respiratory tract infection. Journal of
Occupational and Environmental Hygiene 5: 347–352.
18. Weber TP, Stilianakis NI (2008) Inactivation of influenza A viruses in the
environment and modes of transmission: A critical review. Journal of Infection
57: 361–373.
19. Aledort J, Lurie N, Wasserman J, Bozzette S (2007) Non-pharmaceutical public
health interventions for pandemic influenza: an evaluation of the evidence base.
Bmc Public Health 7: 208.
20. Smieszek T (2009) A mechanistic model of infection: why duration and intensity
of contacts should be included in models of disease spread. Theoretical Biology
and Medical Modelling 6: 25.
21. Julian TR, Canales RA, Leckie JO, Boehm AB (2009) A Model of Exposure to
Rotavirus from Nondietary Ingestion Iterated by Simulated Intermittent
Contacts. Risk Analysis 29: 617–632.
22. Ferguson AC, Canales RA, Beamer P, Auyeung W, Key M, et al. (2006) Video
methods in the quantification of children’s exposures. Journal of Exposure
Science and Environmental Epidemiology 16: 287–298.
23. Lathem WW, Crosby SD, Miller VL, Goldman WE (2005) Progression of
primary pneumonic plague: A mouse model of infection, pathology, and
bacterial transcriptional activity. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America 102: 17786–17791.
24. Titball RW, Sjostedt A (2003) Francisella tularensis: an overview. Asm News 69:
558–563.
25. Djavani M, Yin C, Xia L, Lukashevich IS, Pauza CD, et al. (2000) Murine
immune responses to mucosally delivered Salmonella expressing Lassa fever
virus nucleoprotein. Vaccine 18: 1543–1554.
26. Roman S (2008) Advanced Linear Algebra. New York: Springer.
27. Nazaroff WW, Cass GR (1989) Mathemtical-modeling of indoor aerosol
dynamics. Environmental Science & Technology 23: 157–166.
28. Xu MD, Nematollahi M, Sextro RG, Gadgil AJ, Nazaroff WW (1994)
Deposition of tobacco-smoke particles in a low ventilation room. Aerosol Science
and Technology 20: 194–206.
29. Lai ACK, Nazaroff WW (2000) Modeling indoor particle deposition from
turbulent flow onto smooth surfaces. Journal of Aerosol Science 31: 463–476.
30. Haas CN, Rose JB, Gerba CP (1999) Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment.
New York: Wiley.
31. Haas CN (2002) Conditional dose-response relationships for microorganisms:
Development and application. Risk Analysis 22: 455–463.
32. Bartrand TA, Weir MH, Haas CN (2008) Dose-response models for inhalation
of Bacillus anthracis spores: Interspecies comparisons. Risk Analysis 28:
1115–1124.
33. Lim DV, Simpson JM, Kearns EA, Kramer MF (2005) Current and developing
technologies for monitoring agents of bioterrorism and biowarfare. Clinical
Microbiology Reviews 18: 583–607.
34. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website. Bioterrorism Agents/
Diseases. Available: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp. Ac-
cessed 2012 Feb 8.
35. Morgan MG, Henrion M, Morris SC, Amaral DAL (1985) Uncertainty in risk
assessment. Environmental Science & Technology 19: 662–667.
36. Mitchell-Blackwood J, Gurian PL (2010) Finding Risk-Based Switchover Points
for Response Decisions for Environmental Exposure to Bacillus anthracis (in press).
Human and Ecological Risk Assessment.
37. Huang Y, Hong T, Bartrand TA, Gurian PL, Haas CN, et al. (2010) How
sensitive is safe? Risk-based targets for ambient monitoring of pathogens. Sensors
Journal, IEEE 10: 668–673.
38. West JS, Atkins SD, Emberlin J, Fitt BDL (2008) PCR to predict risk of airborne
disease. Trends in Microbiology 16: 380–387.
39. Dorevitch S, Ashbolt NJ, Ferguson CM, Fujioka R, McGee CD, et al. (2010)
Meeting Report: Knowledge and Gaps in Developing Microbial Criteria for
Inland Recreational Waters. Environ Health Perspect 118: 871–876.
40. Bae S, Wuertz S (2009) Discrimination of Viable and Dead Fecal Bacteroidales
Bacteria by Quantitative PCR with Propidium Monoazide. Applied and
Environmental Microbiology 75: 2940–2944.
41. Ruijter JM, Ramakers C, Hoogaars WMH, Karlen Y, Bakker O, et al. (2009)
Amplification efficiency: linking baseline and bias in the analysis of quantitative
PCR data. Nucleic Acids Research 37: e45.
42. Bushon RN, Kephart CM, Koltun GF, Francy DS, Schaefer FW, et al. (2010)
Statistical assessment of DNA extraction reagent lot variability in real-time
quantitative PCR. Letters in Applied Microbiology 50: 276–282.
43. Busson B (1911) Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der Lebensdauer von Bacterium coli und
Milzbrandsporen. . 58 p.
44. Mitscherlich E, Marth EH (1984) Microbial survival in the environment:
bacteria and rickettsiae important in human and animal health. Berlin,
Germany: Springer-Verlag.
45. Graham-Smith GS (1930) The longevity of dry spores of B. anthracis. Journal of
Hydrology 30: 213–215.
46. Novel R, Reh T (1947) De la longevite des spores du Bacillus anthracis et de la
conservation des pouvoirs pathogene et antigene. Schweiz Z Pathol Bakteriol 10:
180–192.
47. Szekely AV (1903) Beitrag zur Lebensdauer der Milzbrandsporen. Z Hyg
Infectionskrankh 44: 359–363.
48. Won WD, Ross H (1966) Effect of diluent and relative humidity on apparent
viability of airborne pasteurella pestis. Applied and Environmental Microbiology
14: 742–745.
49. Rose LJ, Donlan R, Banerjee SN, Arduino MJ (2003) Survival of Yersinia pestis
on environmental surfaces. Applied and Environmental Microbiology 69:
2166–2171.
50. Wilkinson TR (1966) Survival Of Bacteria On Metal Surfaces. Applied
Microbiology 14: 303–307.
51. Cox CS, Goldberg LJ (1972) Aerosol Survival Of Pasteurella-Tularensis And
Influence Of Relative Humidity. Applied Microbiology 23: 1–3.
52. Cox CS (1971) Aerosol Survival Of Pasteurella-Tularensis Disseminated From
Wet And Dry States. Applied Microbiology 21: 482–486.
53. Ehrlich R, Miller S (1973) Survival Of Airborne Pasteurella-Tularensis At
Different Atmospheric Temperatures. Applied Microbiology 25: 369–372.
Prioritizing Risks of Category A Pathogens
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 18 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e3273254. Harper GJ (1961) Airborne Micro-Organisms-Survival Tests With 4 Viruses.
Journal of Hygiene 59: 479–486.
55. Harper GJ (1963) The influence of environment on the survival of airborne virus
particles in the laboratory. Arch Gesamte Virusforsch 13: 64–71.
56. Mahl MC, Sadler C (1975) Virus Survival On Inanimate Surfaces. Canadian
Journal of Microbiology 21: 819–823.
57. Stephenson EH, Larson EW, Dominik JW (1984) Effect of environmental factors
on aerosol-induced lassa virus infection. Journal of Medical Virology 14:
295–303.
58. Hardestam J, Simon M, Hedlund KO, Vaheri A, Klingstom J, et al. (2007) Ex
vivo stability of the rodent-borne hantaan virus in comparison to that of
arthropod-borne members of the Bunyaviridae family. Applied and Environ-
mental Microbiology 73: 2547–2551.
59. Altboum Z, Gozes Y, Barnea A, Pass A, White M, et al. (2002) Postexposure
prophylaxis against anthrax: Evaluation of various treatment regimens in
intranasally infected guinea pigs. Infection and Immunity 70: 6231–6241.
60. Day WC, Berendt RF (1972) Experimental tularemia in Macaca mulatta:
relationship of aerosol particle size to the infectivity of airborne Pasteurella
tularensis. Infect Immun 5: 77–82.
61. Marshall RG, Gerone PJ (1961) Susceptibility of suckling mice to variola virus.
J Bacteriol 82: 15–19.
62. @RISK website. Available: http://www.palisade.com. Accessed 2011 Oct 10.
Prioritizing Risks of Category A Pathogens
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 19 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e32732